# UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-57 9 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

on Congressional Reviews

SUBJECT

: Guidelines for Sanitizing Certain Documents

Provided to Select Committees

1. In keeping with the 2 April 1975 request of the Ad Hoc Group, the Security Committee members reviewed and revised the guidelines proposed for use by the intelligence community to assist in sanitizing documents which may be provided Select Committees. On 8 April 1975, the Security Committee members, with the exception of the representative from the Department of State who was absent and the representative from the Department of the Army who was present for only part of the meeting, agreed to the guidelines.

2. The guidelines are attached and are submitted for consideration of members of the Ad Hoc Group.

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Chairman

Attachment

## GUIDELINES FOR SANITIZING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES

- 1. The Director of Central Intelligence has recently discussed with Senator Church the need for special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee of certain sensitive aspects of intelligence activities and the Senator has expressed his recognition of this need. It is anticipated that appropriate arrangements can be made so as to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time satisfying the Select Committees' need for a full understanding of the intelligence community's activities. Included in such matters are the identities of sensitive sources, the material provided to the United States by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain employees whose safety could be jeopardized if revealed, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with US intelligence and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems. Such material should be protected not only from exposure but indeed the risk of exposure. Further, recognition should be given to the need to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals.
- 2. Proper sanitization procedures should enable intelligence community members to prevent risk of disclosure of sensitive sources and methods and at the same time present to the Select Committees the necessary details to allow for their proper understanding of community activities.
- 3. The sanitization procedures described herein are not to be used as downgrading or declassification guides. All concerned should be mindful that application of these procedures will not declassify, downgrade or remove from compartmentation controls any documents or information provided the Select Committees, unless individual advice to that effect is provided as well.

#### 4. What May Be Sanitized

While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which may be levied by the Committees for documenting material and not

possible to determine specifically what material should be excised from these documents, the following illustrations are offered in certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet the test mentioned above.

#### 5. Collection of Intelligence

- (a) The Committees will probably address the matter of how intelligence is collected. Documents supporting responses may be sanitized by removal of identities of sensitive agents and informants, covert personnel, and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be substituted, i.e., a foreign journalist, a political official in the opposition party. No sanitization should be used in connection with names of individuals whose employment or former employment by, or association with a department or agency, does not remain secret or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements remain secret.
- (b) Some information may be required with respect to technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived by use of these codenames or nicknames in classified documents. Details of the technical systems which would reveal critical operational capabilities and contractual and funding arrangements which would identify individuals whose participation was obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in the community's sanitization procedure. While documentary samples of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of testimony, raw products which reveal critical operational capabilities should be sanitized.

#### 6. Intelligence Estimates

Finished intelligence reports and estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not normally require sanitization. However, departments and agencies should review such publications to ensure deletion of sensitive source identities and details of collection systems.

#### 7. Administration

Information concerning the administration of intelligence agencies may be requested. This may include staffing charts with occupants identified. Identities of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning in a cover assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future be considered for a covert assignment.

#### 8. General

The following categories of information or specific examples may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should be given by the department or agency concerned to the necessity of deletion or sanitization of this type of information, prior to providing the document.

- (a) Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.
- (b) Details which would reveal sensitive methods and techniques (1) employed in human source collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.
- (c) The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment, attempted recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targeted foreign organizations.

- (d) Names of particular employees whose physical safety or future careers might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.
- (e) Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.
- (f) Assumed identities, locations or other information permitting identification of defectors or refugees who might be targeted for retaliation.
- (g) Identifying information on intelligence services of friendly and neutral countries and collaboration of those services with US intelligence agencies.
- (h) Identification of technical foreign intelligence operations of high vulnerability or extremely high political sensitivity.
- (i) Details of arrangements with US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of intelligence operations.
- (j) Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that collaborate in a special manner such as providing cover for foreign intelligence operations.
- (k) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).
  - (1) Proprietary, trade secret or patent information.

### 9. Techniques of Sanitization

Sanitization of intelligence material is usually considered the act of physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing from written communication with or without regard for the residual content. Use of a substitute term is an example of sanitization which permits intelligent continuity of the material without revealing the true identity. Sanitization does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material in this context.

The integrity of official records must be maintained. The following sanitization techniques apply only to copies of records.

- (a) Names may be obliterated, masked or replaced with substitute terms, the residual material xeroxed and the copy submitted to Committees.
- (b) The material can be retyped or reprinted with substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal the sensitive material.
- (c) Entire pages can be removed from some documents and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing department or agency.
- (d) Within a category of inquiry, it may be desirable to extract a complete document from requested material when the request is broad and all-inclusive within its field. The existence of such a document should be made known to the Committees but retained by the agency or department for review under escort of a representative of the department or agency.

## 10. Management of Sanitization

The original record and a copy of the sanitized version provided should be readily available in all cases. Materials developed within an agency or department in response to requests should be reviewed

at an appropriate level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. In the case of documents or materials of a community nature, the release should be done in coordination with the departments or agencies and/or the Program Manager concerned and any sanitization should be agreed upon during coordination.

This proposed use of sanitization as a special arrangement to protect selected issues contained in material provided to Select Committees by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies. It is essential to the proposal that departments and agencies attempt to employ the same criteria for sanitization and coordinate as required. This paper can serve only as general guidelines on sanitization.